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Abstract 
This PhD by published work comprises nine papers published between 2000 and 2013 and a 
case for support. The research focuses upon the comparative institutional analysis of public and 
private operations of urban water supply and sanitation services in developed, transition and 
developing countries. This topic is of scholarly relevance because the debate on the relative 
efficiency of public and private water operations remains unresolved. The research objectives 
are to evaluate theoretical expectations of private sector efficiency and public sector 
inefficiency, and identify the fundamental causal mechanism of the relative efficiency of public 
and private operations in the urban water sector.   
 
In the aim of contributing to a critical realist theory of the firm, the review of extant theory is 
situated within the metatheoretical debate between orthodox and heterodox economic theory. 
To support the investigation of the duality of agency and institutions, a composite analytical 
framework is devised by integrating the Williamsonian tradition of comparative institutional 
analysis with the policy networks tradition, and adapted to reflect the characteristics of 
transactions in the urban water sector. Evidence is derived from a unique body of qualitative 
case studies produced in 14 years of empirical research, and looking at the relative efficiency 
of public and private water operations in developed, transition and developing countries. 
Interpreting the evidence through the lens of the analytical framework allows for ascertaining 
the regularities produced by public and private operations in terms of aligned actors’ attitudes, 
power and institutions.        
 
The thesis makes three main contributions. First, mainstream expectations of superior private 
sector efficiency in the urban water sector do not hold. This is due to the alignment of the profit 
maximisation imperative inherent to the private sector, and the formal institutions that 
reproduce power asymmetries under private sector participation. This alignment results in 
private water operators appropriating net gains at the expense of the served communities. 
Second, mainstream expectations of intrinsic public sector inefficiency are unfounded. This is 
due to the alignment of public water operators’ low-powered incentives to appropriate net gains 
– incentives resulting from the fact that the profit maximisation imperative does not apply to 
the public sector, and formal institutions reducing power asymmetries between governance 
participants. This alignment can and does lead to public sector efficiency. Third, consisting in 
the alignment of actors’ motivation, actors’ power, and institutions with sustainable 
development objectives, remediable institutional alignment is the fundamental causal 
mechanism behind relative efficiency in the urban water sector.  
 
Remediable institutional alignment accounts for the necessity of private inefficiency and the 
possibility of public efficiency. It thus innovates in relation to extant theories of the firm that 
predict the necessity of private efficiency and public inefficiency (public choice and property 
right theory), the possibility of public and private efficiency (Williamson’s comparative 
institutional analysis), and the necessity of public efficiency and private inefficiency (market 
failure). Remediable institutional alignment’s predictions suggest that the public sector should 
be preferred over the private sector to enhance sustainable water development, and that in-
house restructuring should be adopted to underpin and secure public sector efficiency.     
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Introduction 
This PhD by published work comprises nine papers published between 2000 and 2013 and a 
case for support. The research focuses upon the comparative institutional analysis of public and 
private operations of urban water supply and sanitation services in developed, transition and 
developing countries. This topic is of scholarly and policy relevance. In fact, it is germane to 
the provision of essential public services whose institutional reform affects the wellbeing of 
communities in the global North and South. Also, the debate on the relative efficiency of public 
and private operations of water services remains unresolved. Having participated in the so-
called public vs. private debate in the urban water sector for the last 15 years, my motivation to 
undertake a PhD by published work is twofold: a) to take stock of my research on the subject; 
and, b) to lay the grounds for more theoretically informed research work in my future career. 
 
The theoretical debate on the effects of ownership on the performance of water service 
providers remains unresolved. Influenced by orthodox or mainstream economic theory, rational 
choice theories of the firm such as public choice and property rights have dominated scholarly 
discourse and informed policy in the last few decades (Peters, 2005; Self, 1993). These strands 
of thought argue for the superior efficiency of the private sector in the provision of water supply 
and sanitation (Renzetti and Dupont, 2003; Boyne, 1998), and have inspired the Washington 
and Post-Washington Consensus insistence on private sector participation (PSP) in the water 
sector (Bayliss, 2006, 2001). The World Bank and like-minded bodies insist on promoting PSP 
despite the fact that mainstream theories of the firm fail to provide satisfactory predictions and 
socially acceptable prescriptions. This failure is demonstrated by the lack of evidence of 
superior private sector efficiency (Bel et al., 2010), widespread social resistance against PSP 
(Hall et al., 2005), the increasing termination and remunicipalisation of private contracts (Hall 
and Lobina, 2009A; Hall et al., 2013; Kishimoto et al., 2015), and a growing body of evidence 
on successful in-house restructuring (Lobina and Hall, 2009, 2008, 2007, 2000). In the absence 
of a credible alternative, the intellectual hegemony of rational choice remains unchallenged 
(Crouch, 2007; Fine, 2009). Our understanding of the process and outcome of water service 
reform thus remains inadequate and important social needs are left unattended.  
 
The limitations of mainstream theories of the firm call for new theoretical accounts that better 
reflect economic reality to better guide policy on organisational change. This thesis aims to 
ascertain the regularities produced by different reform options so as to shed light on the real-
world dynamics of relative efficiency in the urban water sector, and to contribute to a heterodox 
and critical realist theory of the firm alternative to rational choice theories of the firm. The 
research objectives are to: a) evaluate theoretical expectations of private sector efficiency in the 
urban water sector; b) evaluate theoretical expectations of public sector inefficiency in the urban 
water sector; and, c) identify the fundamental causal mechanism of the relative efficiency of 
public and private operations in the urban water sector. Attaining the first two research 
objectives allows for deconstructing a mainstream narrative premised on the assumption of 
inherent private sector efficiency, and oblivious of the possibility of public sector efficiency. 
Achieving the third objective is part of the reconstruction of a heterodox and critical realist 
narrative of relative efficiency alternative to public choice and property rights theory.      
 
The published work submitted looks at the experience of water service reform in developed, 
transition and developing countries over the last 25 years. This work rests on the qualitative 
observation of real-life case studies and allows for generating in-depth and context-specific 
understandings, exploring issues of how and why, and generalising from these qualitative 
insights back to theory. Hence, my published work addresses the comparative institutional 
analysis of public and private water operations by using a methodological approach consistent 
with the set aims and research objectives. This case for support attempts to situate my inquiry 
within the wider context of my field of research, and illustrate its original contribution to the 
public versus private debate in the urban water sector and the theory of the firm.  
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This case for support is structured as follows. The section on Practical background outlines the 
fundamentals of urban water service reform, and offers an overview of the history of water 
service reform in the global North and South. The section on Theoretical background places a 
number of theoretical traditions relevant to the public versus private debate in the urban water 
sector within the context of the metatheoretical debate between orthodox and heterodox 
economic theory. These theoretical traditions include rational choice theories such as public 
choice and property rights, and transaction cost economics. Their limitations are explained in 
light of the orthodox assumptions that underpin their predictions. The section on Methodology 
develops an analytical framework by integrating the Williamsonian tradition of transaction cost 
economics and comparative institutional analysis with the policy networks tradition. A second 
sub-section is devoted to the methods used to gather and analyse the empirical evidence 
contained in the work submitted. The section on Empirical evidence reviews the empirical 
observations on the relative efficiency of public and private water operations derived from the 
submitted published work. In the Discussion of findings, the contribution of the work submitted 
is discussed through the lens of my analytical framework. Here, the results are shown to meet 
the research objectives set out. This section also sketches a research agenda for the creation of 
a heterodox theory of the firm alternative to public choice and property rights theory. The case 
for support ends with Conclusions. Finally, the appendices contain tables provide a synopsis of 
the evidence, and the full text of papers included in the submission.         
 
Practical background: Urban water service reform 
Urban water services include the provision of water supply, sewerage and wastewater treatment 
services to urban communities. These are essential public services which satisfy basic human 
needs and prevent public health hazards (Heller, 2009). Access to quality water services has a 
positive impact on economic and social development and on poverty reduction (UNESCO-
WWAP, 2006). By reducing pollution, sanitation services play a fundamental role in enhancing 
environmental development (McGranahan et al., 2001; McGranahan and Satterthwaite, 2002). 
Sustainable water development is a normative objective of water service provision, which 
consists in the development of water operations that contributes to social, environmental and 
economic development in the long term. It also implies the pursuit of equal and universal access 
to quality water services (Lobina, 2012). In practice, high income countries tend to accord 
higher priority to environmental development than low income countries where public health 
and social welfare objectives are emphasised (McGranahan et al., 2001). 
   
The economics and organisation of urban water services are determined by technology. Water 
services are a typical natural monopoly so that only one operator is allowed to operate in a 
given operation area. The reform opportunity set ranges from the appointment without 
competition of a public undertaking, to the selection of a private operator through competition 
for the market and subject to a long term contract (Lobina and Hall, 2010). The organisational 
forms considered for this comparative institutional analysis include in-house provision and 
various forms of PSP: outright divestiture, concessions and lease contracts among others 
(Lobina, 2005). Regulation is seen as a substitute for or complement to competition, and it 
either takes the form of scrutiny by the conceding authorities or arms’ length regulation by a 
specialised agency (Lobina and Hall, 2010).  
 
Technology, market structure, and scope for competition have a number of implications for the 
sustainability of PSP in the urban water sector. First, the relationship between regulatory 
authorities and regulated private operators is characterized by asymmetry of information. 
Otherwise put, the regulated operator tends to know the quantity and quality of the service 
provided and the investments implemented better than regulatory authorities (Laffont, 1994; 
Joskow, 2007). Second, water service provision is a highly capital intensive industry. 
Transferring high capital costs to consumers in the form of full cost pricing can undermine 
affordability and service access for the poor and vulnerable consumers (Bakker, 2010).        
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For the purposes of this thesis, relative efficiency is defined as the capability of public and 
private water operators to produce the maximum amount of outputs from a given set of inputs. 
This definition corresponds to the definition of technical efficiency and not that of price 
efficiency, or the ability to maximise profit as a result of the chosen inputs (Farrell, 1957). The 
rationale for opting for the former definition lies in the recognition that efficiency is 
instrumental to the achievement of effectiveness in the delivery of water operations (Lobina, 
2012). In addition, under natural monopoly price efficiency does not guarantee effectiveness as 
operators can appropriate profits and fail to reinvest (Lobina, 2013). Conversely, technical 
efficiency accounts for the effective provision of sustainable water services in terms of quality 
and quantity, equality and universality. Otherwise put, relative efficiency amounts to the 
comparative advantage of public and private water operators in the continued expansion of 
service coverage, enhancement of affordability, improvement of service quality, and 
optimisation of social, economic and environmental interventions (Lobina and Hall, 2008).             
   
Theoretical background: Orthodox and heterodox 
economic theory  
Metatheory is a system of thought or paradigm that defines the grand principles underlying the 
formulation of theory and informing assessments of the relevance of evidence. Metatheory thus 
offers a framework for theory development and the revisitation of extant theory (Lehman, 1988; 
Ritzer, 1990). It is important that social scientists make explicit the adopted metatheoretical 
frameworks, to reveal how their assumptions relate to those of other participants in inter-
paradigmatic dialogues (Fuhrman and Snizek, 1990). Hence, the discussion of the submitted 
published work is situated within the context of the metatheoretical debate between orthodox 
and heterodox economic theory. These metatheoretical frameworks represent divergent 
approaches to dealing with social and institutional complexity: orthodox economics tends to 
reduce, while heterodox economics seeks to embrace complexity.  
 
Orthodox economics embraces neoclassical notions of instrumental rationality and utility 
maximisation, equilibrium and mathematical formalism as its methodological foundations. This 
results in a closed-system ontology, the assumption of linear causality, deductivism, 
determinism and reductionism. The methodological foundations of heterodox economics are 
critical realism and institutionalism, non-equilibrium and historical modelling, and 
methodological pluralism (i.e. the rejection of mathematical formalism and deductivism as the 
only acceptable forms of reasoning). This implies an open-system ontology and the assumption 
of circular, cumulative, and ultimately path dependent causation (Dow, 2011; Lee, 2011; 
Lawson, 2006; Hodgson, 2000; Pluta, 2010).  
 
Orthodox economics has influenced theories of the firm relevant to this inquiry. Moving from 
neoclassical premises (Langlois, 1994), Pigou (1932) offered the basis for the theory of market 
failure. This posits that government intervention in the production of goods and services is 
justified whenever the market cannot produce the expected results in terms of welfare 
distribution, as is the case in presence of natural monopoly. Market failure theory has been 
criticised for being based on deductivism, lacking an adequate empirical basis (Zerbe and 
McCurdy, 1999), and unrealistically assuming a costless, omniscient and benevolent state 
(Demsetz, 1996; Hummel, 1987). Orthodox economics has also influenced rational choice 
theories of the firm, such as public choice and property rights, whose prescriptions on the 
desirability of government delivery of public services are antithetic to those of market failure. 
In fact, public choice and property rights theory assume instrumental rationality (Peters, 2005; 
Self, 1993; Dietrich, 1994) and their development is, much like market failure, based on 
deductivism. A clear example of deductivist theorising in the tradition of property rights is 
represented by Demsetz’s (1968) abstract argument that ex-ante competition unproblematically 
leads to ex-post efficiency. Another such example is Hart et al.’s (1997) model for the definition 
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of the proper scope of government. This leads to conclusions that “are generally extremely 
intuitive” (Hart et al., 1997: 1130), and are extrapolated to the garbage collection sector without 
much empirical support.  
 
The demise of the “old institutionalist economics”, which partly explains the absence of an 
established heterodox alternative to public choice and property right theory, has been attributed 
to its limited theoretical underpinnings (Coase, 2000). Lee (2011) asserts that heterodox 
microeconomics is an emergent discipline and that critical realism constitutes its ontological 
basis. This has a number of implications for the epistemological potential of the heterodox 
theory of the firm. First, critical realism advances that there is causal necessity in the world 
(Sayer, 1992, King, 1999) and is concerned with identifying the fundamental causal 
mechanisms of social phenomena (Bhaskar, 1989; Pratten, 1993). Second, the emancipatory 
nature of critical realism (Bhaskar, 1989) calls for critically evaluating the process and outcome 
of economic activity through the lens of social justice. Third, critical realism recognises the 
creative potential of agency and the ability of institutions to enable and constrain agency 
(Cleaver, 2012; Bhaskar, 1989; Pratten, 1997, 1993). Fourth, critical realism embraces 
epistemological relativism, or the belief that knowledge of economic events is historically 
contingent and concept-dependent (Lee, 2011; Sayer, 1992). A heterodox and critical realist 
approach bears promise of developing the theory of the firm with an attention to complexity 
that cannot be found in the mainstream tradition. 
 
Public choice and property rights theory 
Rational choice consists in the common assumptions informing a variety of theories of the firm, 
including public choice and property rights theory. These assumptions are that individuals are 
rational, are intrinsically self-interested, and take actions aimed at maximising their own utility 
(Self, 1993; Dietrich, 1994). These theories also share methods, predictions and prescriptions. 
More precisely, these theoretical perspectives are theories of non-market failure (Lowery, 
1998) which predict government failure in the provision of water services and recommend the 
introduction of PSP in the urban water sector. For a more detailed review of rational choice 
theories of the firm, see Lobina (2013), and Lobina and Hall (2007).  
 
Public choice theory contends that public service provision is intrinsically inefficient due to the 
self-interested behaviour of public managers who prioritise budget maximisation over the 
public interest (Renzetti and Dupont, 2003). This view stems from the following premises: 
individual voters cannot control the political process, nor keep politicians accountable; interest 
groups manipulate the political process to their advantage; elected politicians cannot effectively 
control bureaucracies; interest groups, politicians and bureaucrats mutually exchange favours 
to the detriment of voters and consumers (Self, 1993). Conversely, public choice theory expects 
contracting out to improve performance as a result of competitive pressures (Boyne, 1998). It 
is also argued that insulation from self-serving political interference results in the superior 
efficiency of regulated private enterprises over public undertakings. This insulation arises from 
the fact that the institutional framework supporting privatization guarantees profitability in 
order to attract private investment (Willig, 1994). 
 
Property rights theory expects the incentives derived from specifying property rights to induce 
efficient resource allocation (Furubotn and Pejovich, 1972). In this view, the case for superior 
private sector efficiency rests on the “weak incentives of government employees with respect 
to both cost reduction and quality innovation” (Shleifer, 1998, p. 138). The plurality of 
objectives pursued by the public sector, including social justice, also goes to the detriment of 
productive efficiency (Lorrain, 1997). Premised on property rights, Demsetz (1968) argues in 
favour of competition for the market, via competitive bidding for a franchise, when competition 
in the market is unfeasible. Regulation and renegotiation might be necessary to avoid excessive 
windfalls if the durability of investments requires entering long term contracts (Demsetz, 1968), 
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as is typically the case of urban water services. So-called Demsetz competition is expected to 
promote the efficiency of monopolists by sanctioning poor performance through the threat of 
franchise termination, suspension, or non-renewal, and to mitigate the risk of regulatory capture 
by minimising agency discretion (Baldwin and Cave, 1999). 
 
Studies that comparatively assess the operational performance of public and private water 
operators fail to find evidence of superior private sector efficiency (Lobina, 2013; Hall and 
Lobina, 2009A). Explanations provided in the quantitative literature for the absence of superior 
private sector efficiency include: the limited competitiveness of the water sector (Bel and 
Warner, 2008); the presence of substantial transaction costs (Ménard and Saussier, 2000; Chong 
et al., 2006; Bel et al., 2010); the fact that private operators reap all efficiency gains through 
profits (Gassner et al., 2009); and, improved public performance due to public sector innovation 
(Estache and Rossi, 2002). While the debate on the determinants of relative efficiency remains 
open, rational choice expectations of superior private sector efficiency in the urban water sector 
appear unfounded. This demands a critical reappraisal of orthodox theories of the firm and 
filling the knowledge gaps left by these theories. More precisely, the determinants of private 
sector inefficiency and public sector efficiency remain to be identified.  
 
Transaction cost economics 
This case for support mobilises Oliver Williamson’s tradition of transaction cost economics. 
As shown in Lobina (2013), Williamson’s heuristic framework represents a sound basis for the 
comparative institutional analysis of public and private water operations. The Williamsonian 
tradition of transaction cost economics presents similarities and differences with property right 
theory. Like property right theory, Williamson (1988) adopts bounded rationality as a 
behavioural assumption, mitigating the orthodox assumption of instrumental rationality under 
complete information and postulating that behaviour is intendedly rational but only limitedly 
so. Conversely, Williamson (2002) goes beyond property right theory’s focus on the ex-ante 
alignment of incentives and is concerned with the governance of ongoing contractual relations.      
 
Williamson (1997, 1981) argues that comparative institutional analysis is required to recognise 
the economic institutions mitigating bounded rationality, safeguarding transactions from the 
threat of opportunism, and economising on transaction costs. According to the remediableness 
criterion, all feasible organisational modes - market, hybrid, private bureau, public bureau – are 
flawed. Therefore, comparing an extant organisational mode with an ideal and perfect 
organisational mode is meaningless (Williamson, 2009). Also, the transaction costs associated 
with the attributes of different modes have to be comparatively assessed in light of the nature 
of the transaction to be performed. Among such attributes is asset specificity which, if high, 
can cause a transaction to move from a large-numbers exchange relation in the ex-ante phase 
to a small-number transaction during contract execution. Another key attribute of the 
considered transaction is the intensity of incentives to appropriate net gains, distinguished 
between high- and low-powered incentives. Comparative institutional analysis thus consists in 
the discriminating alignment of the attributes of the transaction considered and the attributes of 
the compared organisational modes (Williamson, 2002, 1999, 1988, 1981).  
 
Williamson’s comparative institutional analysis allows for the possibility of private sector 
inefficiency and public sector efficiency. The possibility of private sector inefficiency is 
implicit in Williamson’s (1976) critique of Demsetz’ (1968) assumption of efficiency achieved 
through “unassisted” competition for the market. The possibility of public sector efficiency is 
assumed in Williamson’s (1999) discussion of the US Department of State and sovereign 
transactions. Williamson’s original contribution to the theory of the firm thus consists in laying 
the grounds for the rejection of the necessary benevolence of government, held by the 
proponents of market failure, and the necessary malevolence of government, predicated by 
public choice and property rights theory. Williamson’s non-deterministic approach to 
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comparative institutional analysis offers fertile ground for the development of a theory of the 
firm consistent with heterodox microeconomics and critical realism.  
 
The development of a heterodox and critical realist theory of the firm would have to confront a 
remarkable fact. For all the importance attached by Williamson to operationalising arguments 
(Pratten, 1997), Williamson (2010) acknowledges that the full formalisation of transaction cost 
economics remains work in progress. The intuition of the possibility of private inefficiency 
under natural monopoly (Williamson, 1976) and public efficiency in performing sovereign 
transactions (Williamson, 1999) is not accompanied by a complete account of relative 
efficiency in executing public sector transactions. Instead, reference is made to “suggestive at 
best” rudiments of the theoretical formalisation of transaction cost economics (Williamson, 
1999, p. 338).    
 
A critique that is particularly relevant for this case for support is Granovetter’s (1985) assertion 
that Williamson (1975) provides an undersocialised account of economic action which neglects 
the role of social relations in conditioning behaviour. Granovetter (1985) argues that 
Williamson (1975) conceives of agents as atomized individuals thus failing to recognise the 
embeddedness of economic action in structures of social relations and institutions. This critique 
points to a number of tensions in Williamson’s tradition of transaction cost economics. First, 
the retention of bounded rationality as a rational choice behavioural assumption conflicts with 
Williamson’s interest in the complexity of human behaviour and, together with his deductivist 
view of explanation, results in reductionism (Pratten, 1997). Second, despite power being 
central to the explanation of agency (Wrenn, 2006), Williamson dismisses power as an 
explanatory variable only to replace it with the equally tautological notion of transaction costs 
(Williamson, 1997). Third, Williamson’s conception of institutions is confined to formal rules 
and in particular to organisational structure and contract law, thus failing to account for the 
influence of informal institutions on behaviour (Williamson, 2000). Developing the theory of 
the firm from a heterodox and critical realist vantage point lends itself to resolving these 
tensions, which relate to an essential preoccupation of heterodox economics and critical 
realism: the interdependence of agency and structure (Bhaskar, 1989; Pratten, 1997). 
    
Methodology: Analytical framework and methods 
By contributing to the public versus private debate in the urban water sector, the candidate has 
engaged in an exercise of comparative institutional analysis (Lobina, 2005; Lobina and Hall, 
2008, 2007, 2000; Hall and Lobina, 2007, 2004), albeit in the absence of an explicit theoretical 
starting point. It is only Lobina (2013) that formally integrates Williamson’s comparative 
institutional analysis apparatus taking inspiration from heterodox microeconomics and critical 
realism. This section of the case for support links the submitted published work with the 
methods and philosophy of critical realism. 
 
Pratten (1993) identifies transcendental realism as the philosophy of science incorporated into 
critical realism and illustrates Bhaskar’s (1986) distinction between the real, the actual and the 
empirical, as a distinction between, respectively: causal mechanisms; social phenomena; and, 
the experience of social phenomena. Transcendental realism’s three phases of scientific 
discovery are: 1) identification and description of the effect which is the object of analysis; 2) 
postulation of a hypothetical causal mechanism (drawing on extant theory and models) 
explaining the effect; and, 3) demonstration of the existence and operation of the postulated 
causal mechanism - both positively, through the direct observation of the causal mechanism, 
and negatively, by the elimination of alternative explanations (Pratten, 1993; Bhaskar, 1989). 
The consideration of these three phases from a heterodox and critical realist perspective reveals 
important methodological implications. 
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First, methodological pluralism implies that qualitative methods hold claims to scientific 
validity to the same extent that quantitative methods do. The use of qualitative case studies to 
derive inference is well established as a method of theorising in social science, not only in 
critical realism (Sayer, 1992), but also in the tradition of New Institutional Economics 
(Williamson, 1999, 1976). This methodological strategy, based on an intensive approach to the 
generation of insights, promises to be a fruitful approach to explore issues of how and why in 
an emerging field.  
 
Second, critical realism requires that the extant theories and models selected for the postulation 
of hypothetical causal mechanisms embrace complexity. In this sense, the combination of 
paradox and theoretical bricolage is a promising methodological strategy. Paradox is predicated 
upon oppositional thinking (Lado et al., 2006), thus allowing for the separation of the wheat 
from the chaff in a theoretical account. Theoretical bricolage (Kincheloe, 2005, 2001) is apt to 
establish synergies between multiple perspectives and devise a composite framework 
recognising the complexity of the analysed social phenomena. The combination of paradox and 
bricolage as an epistemic strategy of splitting and integration of knowledge (Smith and Lewis, 
2011), can thus contribute to the explanatory power of theory. 
 
Third, Lee (2011) proposes the following criteria for the selection of central causal mechanisms 
among a number of possible causal mechanisms: 1) the frequency with which the data shows 
that a mechanism is a cause of the effect analysed; 2) the fact that the mechanism clearly 
contributes to the explanatory power of a theory and is central to its narrative; 3) the fact that 
the mechanism allows for complexity.  
 
Analytical framework 
The analytical framework developed for this case for support aims to strengthen Williamson’s 
method of comparative institutional analysis through its integration with complementary 
perspectives. First, this framework retains parts of Williamson’s approach to comparative 
institutional analysis, to reflect the characteristics of transactions in the urban water sector. 
These include: 1) the remediableness criterion as the rationale for comparative institutional 
analysis; 2) asset specificity as the determinant of natural monopoly market structure; 3) 
maximising outputs to enhance sustainable water development as the normative attribute of the 
transactions performed; and, 4) safeguarding transactions from the threat of opportunism as the 
purpose of comparative institutional analysis. Second, this framework integrates the retained 
aspects of the Williamsonian tradition of comparative institutional analysis with a view to 
addressing Granovetter’s (1985) critique of Williamson’s research programme. It does so by 
drawing on Lobina (2013, 2012) and Lobina and Hall (2007), and articulating the components 
of a socialised account of the agency of water service governance. This account operationalises 
the interdependency of agency and structure, in recognition that institutions enable and 
constrain agency without determining it (Granovetter, 1985; Pratten, 1997). 
 
To support the investigation of the duality of agency and institutions, the analytical framework 
uses policy networks – defined as “more or less stable patterns of social relations between 
interdependent actors, which take shape around policy problems and/or policy programmes” 
(Klijn, 1997, p. 14) - as a heuristic representation of water service governance. According to 
the policy networks metaphor, actors in a policy network strategically interact in response to 
their goals, and such interaction is informed by resource dependency (Klijn, 1997). Policy 
networks are used by Lobina and Hall (2007) to shed light on the dynamic interest-seeking of 
private operators and test the cogency of public choice and property rights theory. Lobina 
(2013) develops the policy networks metaphor further by elaborating on its components: a) 
actors’ attitudes as the motivation for agency; b) actors’ power as the means of agency; c) 
institutions as social structures enabling and constraining agency; and, d) institutions as social 
structures shaped by agency in return. 
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Actors’ attitudes provide the motivation for agency and derive from the actors’ own beliefs, 
interests and calculation (Lobina, 2013). The mental model implied in this definition subsumes 
and goes beyond the behavioural assumptions of bounded and instrumental rationality. While 
allowing for utilitarian behaviour, the consideration of beliefs in decision making contemplates 
the possibility that the agent’s values might interfere with self-interest. Lobina’s (2013) 
definition of actors’ attitudes can be improved by incorporating notions of multiple rationalities, 
such as emotional, social, moral, political, economic, and professional rationality (Cleaver, 
2012). Allowing for the multiplicity of rationalities represents an antidote against the risk of 
reducing human rationality to instrumental or functional rationality. In addition to multiple 
rationalities and the exposure of the agent’s rationality to social relations, external incentive 
structures of expected positive and negative sanctions determine attitude formation and 
intensity (Lobina, 2013).    
 
Power can be defined as the ability to induce and resist change and is better understood as an 
asymmetric relationship (Simon, 1953), resulting from resource mobilisation in a relational 
context (Lobina, 2013, 2012). Power produces resource-based dependence between actors 
(Giddens, 1979; Green and Anton, 2010). Therefore, power cannot be confined to the outcome 
of mere resource allocation (Dietrich, 1994) and presupposes the use, actual or expected, of 
resources in a social relationship (Klijn et al., 1995). Relations are characterised by the 
principles of mutuality, conflict and order. Lobina’s (2013) conceptualisation of power thus 
encompasses the mobilisation of a variety of resources through a multiplicity of social relations. 
 
Institutions can be defined as a habit of thought (Veblen, 1898; Hodgson, 1998). They 
constitute the social structure which supports agency and are “implicated in the reproduction of 
social systems” (Giddens, 1979, p. 64). Williamson considers organisations and associated 
formal rules, to be institutions (Scott, 2005). Lobina (2013) integrates Williamson’s view of 
organisations as institutions, and the broad sociological conception of institutions as formal and 
informal rules, norms, and customs (Bakker, 2005). In addition, Lobina (2013) accepts Scott’s 
(2005) distinction between the separated but interconnected elements of institutions: a) the 
regulative pillar of institutions characterised by the logic of instrumentality; b) the normative 
pillar associated to the logic of appropriateness; and, c) the cognitive-cultural pillar with its 
intrinsic logic of orthodoxy. Lobina’s (2013) framework thus recognises institutions as social 
structures enabling and constraining agency, and shaped by agency in return. 
 
The interaction of actors within a policy network is informed by the interaction between 
different sets of incentives and motivations, power and resources, and abilities to use underlying 
institutions to realise aims. This interaction represents a mechanism through which the 
distribution of power within a network is reproduced and altered (Lobina, 2013). The combined 
analytical framework supports historical and critical realist accounts of agency beyond 
instrumental and bounded rationality, the role of power beyond static resource allocation, the 
role of institutions beyond organisations and rules, and the mutual dependence of incentives, 
resources and institutions. It is suitable to investigate path dependent causation in complex open 
systems and is therefore part of a quintessentially heterodox project. 
 
Devised by deploying theoretical bricolage, the analytical framework is apt to address 
epistemological issues raised by transcendental realism. First, by incorporating Williamson’s 
comparative institutional analysis apparatus, the framework is adequate to identify and describe 
the effect of ownership on the performance of urban water operators. Second, the framework 
allows for complexity. It does so by revisiting and equipping Williamson’s comparative 
institutional analysis to produce a socialised account of water service reform, in light of the 
duality of agency and institutions, and the role played by relations and resources in the 
interdependency between agency and institutions. Third, the framework is suitable to guide the 
identification of central causal mechanisms because - constructed around the integration of 
comparative institutional analysis and the analytical dimensions of the motivation for agency, 
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the means of agency and the socially constructed landscape for agency - it allows for a high 
degree of generalisation in accounting for causation.                
 
Methods 
Evidence is derived from qualitative case studies produced in 14 years of empirical research. 
These case studies investigate the relative efficiency of public and private water operations in 
developed, transition and developing countries over the last 25 years, by adopting a multi-
method approach. Secondary data in the form of documentary material – including policy 
publications and regulatory reports, public audits and court rulings, company accounts and 
consultants’ reports, and civil society publications – media coverage, and academic literature 
is examined. This is complemented by semi-structured interviews of company managers and 
policy practitioners. The methods chosen are consistent with the critical realist and heterodox 
preoccupation with analysing the social provisioning process as it really is rather than as it is in 
an ideal world (Lee, 2011). 
 
Empirical evidence was mainly gathered through the Public Services International Research 
Unit’s (PSIRU) global database on water service reform. Empirical observations were first 
presented in several PSIRU Reports, which provide the basis for the empirical generalisations 
(Wallace, 1969) arrived at by inference and presented in the published work submitted. The 
PSIRU Reports constitute a unique body of material as the frequent citations by international 
organisations, policy practitioners and scholars demonstrate. PSIRU Reports authored and co-
authored by the candidate are often cited and referenced in World Bank literature (Estache and 
Goicoechea, 2005) and documents produced by other international bodies such as the OECD 
(2010), UNCTAD (2000, 2008) and the European Parliament (Tucker et al., 2010).   
 
The collected empirical evidence covers a geographical breadth and a variety of institutional 
arrangements which are adequate to support the generalisation of findings. For example, Tables 
1 and 2 in Appendix 1 list 30 private contracts reviewed by the submitted published work, 12 
of which in 7 high-income countries and the remaining 18 in 11 middle- and low-income 
countries. Also, Tables 3 and 4 in Appendix 2 list 18 public water operations reviewed by the 
submitted published work, 9 of which in 6 high-income countries and the remaining 9 in 8 
middle- and low-income countries. The collected evidence also covers private contracts 
awarded in the absence and presence of competition for the market, private contracts subject to 
formal and independent economic regulation and private contracts that are not, public operators 
that are in-house departments of local governments and public operators characterised by 
different arms-length relationships with their public owners. 
              
Empirical evidence: Results of the submitted 
published work 
In view to achieve the three research objectives, this section reviews the empirical observations 
of international experiences with public and private water operations derived from the 
submitted published work. These observations relate to evidence on the relative efficiency of 
public and private operations in high-income and middle and low-income countries.   
 
Evaluating theoretical expectations of private sector efficiency 
The evidence reviewed by the submitted published work shows that mainstream expectations 
of inherently superior private sector efficiency in the urban water sector do not hold. In fact, 
both in the global North and South, private water operators engage in monopolistic behaviour 
as they maximise profits to the benefit of shareholders and detriment of the served communities. 
Illustrated in Tables 1 and 2 in Appendix 1, this pattern is explained by the profit maximisation 
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imperative of private operators under conditions of natural monopoly (Lobina, 2013, 2005; 
Lobina and Hall, 2007).    
 
Tables 1 and 2 provide a synopsis of the evidence of monopolistic behaviour by private 
operators, respectively in high-income countries and middle- and low-income countries, as 
evidenced in the submitted published work. Both tables list cases of water privatisation and 
PSP and, for each case, indicate: the location where private operations are performed; the owner 
of the local private operator; the effects of private sector inefficiency, distinguished between 
inflated pricing, reduced or deferred investment, and poor service quality; the factors of private 
sector inefficiency, or the tactics deployed by the private sector to extract net gains from local 
operations. These factors and tactics include: corruption; financial inducements to conceding 
authorities; tariff manipulation; transfer pricing; contract renegotiation; guaranteed profits; 
commercial confidentiality; anti-competitive behaviour; political risk management; and, extra-
legal pressure. Finally, the tables indicate the submitted published work providing the evidence 
for these observations. 
 
The two tables suggest that the pattern of monopolistic behaviour by private water operators is 
extensive. More precisely, the two tables identify 12 cases in high-income countries and 18 
cases in middle- and low-income countries where opportunistic behaviour, in the form of a 
variety of tactics aimed at profit maximisation, results in private sector inefficiency. This 
finding is reinforced by Lobina and Hall’s (2008) estimate that, between 1992 and 2006, 44% 
of privatised water contracts in the world’s cities of more than one million inhabitants were 
affected by termination, disputes on possible termination, or other problems. The upshot is that 
rational choice expectations of the necessity of private sector efficiency in the urban water 
sector, as held by public choice and property right theory, are unfounded.              
 
Evaluating theoretical expectations of public sector inefficiency 
The evidence reviewed by the submitted published work shows that mainstream expectations 
of intrinsic public sector inefficiency in the urban water sector do not hold. In fact, both in the 
global North and South, public water operators can be efficient when compared to private 
operations or against industry standards. Illustrated in Tables 3 and 4 in Appendix 2, this finding 
is explained by the fact that the public sector is not subject to the profit maximisation imperative 
that is the characteristic attribute of private operators (Lobina, 2013; Lobina and Hall, 2000, 
2007, 2008).    
 
Tables 3 and 4 provide a synopsis of the evidence of efficiency by public operators, respectively 
in high-income countries and middle- and low-income countries, as evidenced in the submitted 
published work. Both tables list cases of public water operations and, for each case, indicate: 
the location where public operations are performed; whether the public operator is owned by 
municipal, provincial or national governments; the evidence of public sector efficiency, 
distinguished between satisfactory performance, improved performance, comparison with a 
private bid, horizontal benchmarking, and vertical benchmarking; the factors of public sector 
efficiency, or the institutional and organisational attributes explaining the observed efficiency. 
These factors include: democratic governance; policy learning; threat of privatisation; not-for-
profit partnerships for capacity development; national law; regulation; transparency, 
accountability and participation (TAP); the absence of or limitations to profit motive; 
corporatisation; and, change in organisational scale. Finally, the tables indicate the submitted 
published work providing the evidence for these observations.  
 
The two tables show that public sector efficiency is possible in high-income as well as middle- 
and low-income countries. More precisely, the two tables identify 9 cases in high-income 
countries and 9 cases in middle- and low-income countries where the performance of public 
operators compares positively with industry standards, has improved as a result of in-house 
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restructuring, or exceeds private sector performance. The observed public efficiency results 
from a combination of attributes of the organisational mode, such as the absence of profit 
motive, and the operators’ ability to respond to societal demands, learn from other actors, and 
adapt organisational structure. The upshot is that rational choice expectations of the necessity 
of public sector inefficiency in the urban water sector are unfounded. 
 
Discussion of findings: Causal mechanisms and 
relative efficiency 
This section discusses how the findings from the submitted published work contribute to 
achieving the research objectives set out and filling the knowledge gaps left by mainstream 
theories of the firm. This discussion bears on the causal mechanisms of private sector 
inefficiency, public sector efficiency, and relative efficiency in the urban water sector. Here, 
the reviewed empirical evidence is commented upon with the help of the composite and realist 
analytical framework developed in this case for support. 
  
Causality of private sector inefficiency 
Tables 1 and 2 in Appendix 1 show that private inefficiency is observed in different 
socioeconomic contexts, under contracts operated by different multinationals, and in 
association to different contractual arrangements. Also, some of the private contracts reviewed 
have been awarded through competition for the market (e.g. Buenos Aires, Argentina); others 
in the absence of such competition (e.g. England and Wales, UK). Some contracts have been 
subject to independent economic regulation (e.g. Manila, Philippines); others to regulation by 
conceding authorities (e.g. Grenoble, France). Therefore, the occurrence of inefficiency cannot 
be attributed to location, corporate strategy, contractual typology, or regulatory regime. Instead, 
private sector inefficiency is the product of systematic interest-seeking behaviour (Lobina, 
2013, 2005). Because all private firms pursue profit maximisation as their raison d’être 
(Friedman, 1953; Vickers, 1985), all private water operators are motivated by high-powered 
incentives to appropriate net gains. They can thus be expected to engage in opportunistic 
behaviour of the kind displayed in the 30 cases of PSP reviewed here.  
 
Not only can private water operators take advantage of asymmetry of information to appropriate 
net gains. The relationship between private operators and conceding authorities is better 
described as one of asymmetric power where knowledge plays a central role in the ability of 
actors to achieve their strategic objectives. Superior expertise in drafting and negotiating 
contracts allows private operators to avert performance risk (Lobina, 2005). Private 
concessionaires may control knowledge flows with other actors to their advantage, for example 
by bartering limited technical assistance in exchange for contributions in kind to preserving the 
commercial viability of operations (Lobina and Hall, 2008; Hall and Lobina, 2007). 
Compounded by asymmetric information and limited competitiveness, superior professional 
expertise allows private operators to deploy a broad range of tactics to maximise profits, as 
illustrated by Tables 1 and 2. If relationships with contracting authorities become 
confrontational, private multinationals do not hesitate to exert legal or extra-legal pressure to 
guarantee the expected levels of profitability (Lobina, 2013). Asymmetric power means that 
private operators have the means to appropriate net gains.  
 
Institutions constraining and regularising agency under PSP are biased in favour of private 
operators, who can thus take further advantage of asymmetric power. Superior expertise in 
renegotiating contracts induces private operators to proactively exert pressure on contracting 
authorities. This aims at revising contractual terms in favour of the operator and relies on the 
fact that contract law safeguards contractually agreed profit levels against change in 
circumstances. For private operators, this mechanism has the potential to turn an adventurous 
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bid into an economically advantageous deal. Renegotiation is thus systematic and sought 
shortly after the award (Lobina, 2013, 2005). The bias of contract law in favour of private 
operators also explains the resilience of private sector interests under adverse circumstances. 
Even in cases where contracts have been demonstrably found to be vitiated by corruption, 
private operators’ strategic flexibility has been rewarded through payment of compensation 
settlements or the award of additional contracts (Lobina and Hall, 2007; Lobina, 2013). 
Favourable institutions encourage private water operators to test the limits of Williamson’s 
(1976) prediction that only in extreme circumstances will private operations be terminated. 
Even when this eventuality occurs, compensation claims for damages and lost profits represent 
a last resort for seeking corporate interests (Lobina, 2013, 2005).    
 
PSP is prone to what Williamson (1999) defines as maladaptation hazards, as institutional 
adaptability facilitates the attainment of private operators’ objectives in conflict with the 
intended objectives of contracting authorities. Under PSP, institutional adaptability provides 
the conditions for private operators to deploy asymmetric power and appropriate net gains. In 
turn, contract law allows for the reproduction of power asymmetries in favour of private 
operators. The combination of asymmetric power and institutions favouring private interests is 
lowly remediable, as contracting authorities face high costs to steer private agents away from 
an undesired course of action. Under PSP, institutional alignment causes Willig’s paradox: “it 
is the institutional framework expected to promote efficiency by shielding private operators 
from non-commercial demands (Willig, 1994) that allows private operators to abuse of their 
monopoly power” (Lobina, 2013: p. 123). The causal mechanism of private sector inefficiency 
in the urban water sector is the alignment of private operators’ high-powered incentives to 
appropriate net gains with asymmetric power and favourable institutions.  
 
Causality of public sector efficiency 
Tables 3 and 4 in Appendix 2 show that public sector efficiency is possible in high-income as 
well as middle- and low-income countries. Since the public sector cannot be construed as 
representing an organisational monolith (Hall, 2007), this observation prompts a discussion of 
the attributes of public water operators that affect relative efficiency. It further requires an 
explanation of the possibility of public sector efficiency and inefficiency, and public water 
operators’ ability to move from a condition of inefficiency to one of efficiency. More precisely, 
identifying feasible and successful operational strategies for public sector efficiency and 
organisational strategies for public sector reform is of interest here. Also salient in this 
discussion are the relationships between public managers and workers, public owners, and other 
actors external to the public enterprise that affect the relative efficiency of public water 
operators (Lobina, 2013).  
 
Public water operators may adopt organisational modes ranging from administrative 
departments to corporatized agencies. Contrary to received wisdom (Baietti et al., 2006), and 
as shown in Tables 3 and 4, non-corporatised public operators can perform well. The factors of 
efficiency shared by administrative departments and corporatized agencies include the absence 
of or limitation to profit making, and national law. The absence of the profit maximisation 
imperative means that the conduct of public operators can be informed by low-powered 
incentives to appropriate net gains. These incentives are reinforced by national legislation 
providing for cost recovery and ring-fenced accounts. As a result, public operators acquire the 
financial means and are institutionally constrained to reinvest profits in developing the local 
water system. In these cases, the alignment of the motivation for agency, means of agency, and 
influence of institutions results in relative efficiency (Lobina, 2013). 
 
As illustrated by the cases of Phnom Penh, Cambodia and Tegucigalpa, Honduras, the high-
powered incentives of public managers and workers can result in inefficiency. However, 
wrongdoing and inefficiency in the public sector are not inevitable. Institutional change can in 
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fact reduce power asymmetries between principals and agents, re-establishing hierarchy in 
principal-agent relationships between voters, governments, public managers and workers, and 
allowing a public operator to move from a condition of inefficiency to one of efficiency. In-
house restructuring, or the institutional and organisational reform of public enterprise which 
excludes ownership change, can in fact align the incentives of politicians, public managers and 
workers with public service objectives and the interests of the served communities. This is 
exemplified by the cases of Phnom Penh after 1993 and Tegucigalpa after 1994. As illustrated 
by the case of Kaunas, Lithuania, the alignment of the low-powered incentives of public 
managers and workers, limited power to achieve collective goals, and poorly designed 
institutions for the achievement of collective goals may also result in inefficiency. However, 
this situation is remediable with capacity development, for example by engaging in public-
public partnerships, and in-house restructuring (Lobina and Hall, 2008, 2000; Lobina, 2013). 
 
A number of institutional factors can induce public sector efficiency, including democratic 
governance (Lobina and Hall, 2000; Lobina, 2013), public participation and coercion to adopt 
cost recovery and ring-fenced accounts via lending conditionality (Lobina and Hall, 2008). 
This broad range of strategies for public sector reform can change actors’ attitudes and induce 
efficiency because the public sector is not subject to the profit maximisation imperative. Public 
participation is a case in point. While public enterprises can adopt advanced forms of 
participatory decision making, private operators do not go beyond consulting civil society to 
avoid undermining the profitability of operations (Lobina and Hall, 2008, 2007, 2000). The 
institutional factors of efficiency that impact on operational capacity also derive their 
effectiveness from the absence of profit motive. For example, public-public partnerships 
exclude profit-seeking and are premised on the mobilisation of knowledge as a public, not a 
private good (Lobina and Hall, 2008; Lobina, 2013).   
 
Not only does the absence of profit motive make the alignment of attitudes, power and 
institutions more remediable and adaptable under the public than the private sector. It also is 
the ultimate cause of the relative efficiency of public water operations, which view efficiency 
gains as inputs for the production of outputs rather than outputs to appropriate. In other words, 
the reinvestment of cost savings in developing the local water system is conducive to the 
maximisation of outputs under public operations. In addition, injecting social considerations in 
the decision making process of public operators allows for enhancing allocative efficiency in 
two ways. First, by incentivising public operators to transfer net gains to the served 
communities and maximise output. Second, democratic governance and public participation 
may influence public enterprises to achieve the social, economic and environmental objectives 
that are a higher priority for the served communities. In what Lobina (2013) calls Lorrain’s 
(1997) paradox and contrary to rational choice expectations, multiple agency and low-powered 
incentives are not the cause of public inefficiency, but the determinants of public superiority in 
promoting sustainable water service development.  
 
A fundamental causal mechanism of relative efficiency  
The alignment of high-powered incentives to appropriate net gains, the power to appropriate 
net gains, and institutions underpinning gain appropriation explains private and public 
inefficiency. The alignment of low-powered incentives to appropriate gains, limited power to 
achieve collective goals, and institutions poorly designed institutions for the achievement of 
collective goals may also may also explain public inefficiency. The alignment of low-powered 
incentives to appropriate gains, the power to achieve collective goals, and institutions designed 
to support the achievement of collective goals accounts for public efficiency. None of these 
alignments can be regarded as a fundamental causal mechanism of relative efficiency in the 
urban water sector, because all lack the generality to explain the occurrence of both efficiency 
and inefficiency. Lobina’s (2013) remediable institutional alignment is a fundamental causal 
mechanism of relative efficiency because it is sufficiently general to reveal the cause of public 
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and private inefficiency, and public efficiency. In fact, it consists in the alignment of: a) actors’ 
attitudes, including both high- and low-powered incentives to appropriate net gains; b) actors’ 
power; and, c) institutions. Remediable institutional alignment’s explanatory ability derives 
from the ability to account for all feasible alignments of attitudes, power, and institutions. Other 
causal mechanisms, for example the interplay of agency and institutions, might allow for a 
higher level of generality. However, the advantage of remediable institutional alignment is that 
it operationalises the duality of agency and structure contributing to a more accurate 
understanding of its implications for social causation. 
 
Remediable institutional alignment is concerned with the comparative institutional analysis of 
organisational modes in the urban water sector. This requires the discriminating alignment of 
the attributes of public and private operations with the normative goals of water service 
provision. Hence, the criterion for the evaluation of the comparative advantage of public and 
private operations is twofold. On the one hand, the attributes of the two organisational modes 
are evaluated in light of their ability to achieve relative efficiency. On the other hand, the pursuit 
of sustainable water development requires an attention to adaptive performance, or the ability 
to achieve relative efficiency in a changing environment. Therefore, remediable institutional 
alignment goes beyond property right theory’s unrealistic assumption that ex-ante incentives 
unproblematically lead to efficiency in the ex-post phase. Instead, it considers the 
organisational comparative advantage in maximising outputs from a given set of inputs in the 
short as well as in the long term. Remediable institutional alignment is concerned with both the 
operational flexibility to attain a variety of social, economic, and environmental objectives, and 
organisational adaptability to changes in circumstances.     
      
Remediable institutional alignment predicts the necessity of private sector inefficiency and 
possibility of public sector efficiency. Private operators prioritise maximising profits over 
outputs because they are predisposed to and capable of doing so, and contract law enables them 
to do so. This alignment is lowly-remediable because it means that private operators afford 
resilience to sustainability-oriented change, as they are capable of resisting demands to pursue 
output over profit maximisation. Public operators are predisposed to achieving a multiplicity of 
public interest objectives and are not subject to the profit maximisation imperative. Their 
operational flexibility and institutional adaptability allow for relative efficiency but cannot 
prevent inefficiency. However, institutional change might enable a public operator to move 
from a condition of inefficiency to one of efficiency. In fact, institutions supporting public 
operations are designed to re-establish the intended hierarchy of principal-agent relationships 
in public enterprise governance. This alignment is highly-remediable because public operators 
are less resilient to sustainability-oriented change, as they are amenable to pursuing output 
maximisation. The upshot is that the public sector has a comparative advantage over the private 
sector in achieving relative efficiency, enhancing adaptive performance, and pursuing 
sustainable development objectives.   
 
By predicting the necessity of private sector inefficiency and possibility of public sector 
efficiency, remediable institutional alignment innovates in relation to the extant theory of the 
firm. It does so in relation to the rational choice theory of the firm, as public choice and property 
right theory predict the necessity of private efficiency and public inefficiency. It does so in 
relation to the Williamsonian tradition of comparative institutional analysis which, in the 
absence of a complete operationalisation, predicts the possibility of public and private 
efficiency. It does so in relation to market failure, which predicts the necessity of public 
efficiency and private inefficiency. Remediable institutional alignment’s predictions represent 
the rationale for the following prescriptions. First, policy makers should avoid privatising and 
introducing PSP in the water sector to avoid causing long-term extra costs for the served 
communities and undermining attempts to enhance sustainable water development. Second, 
policy makers should develop institutions designed to support the comparative advantage of the 
public sector in pursuing sustainable development objectives. Remediable institutional 
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alignment thus predicts market failure without assuming a benevolent government, and 
prescribes institutional change to underpin and secure public sector efficiency.   
 
A heterodox and critical realist project 
As a fundamental causal mechanism of relative efficiency, remediable institutional alignment 
is a core component of a prospective heterodox and critical realist theory of the firm. The notion 
of remediable institutional alignment has been developed through transcendental realism’s 
three phases of scientific discovery. First, by describing the process and outcome of public and 
private water operations through years of empirical research. Second, by drawing on extant 
theory to develop a composite framework that is postulated to be a causal mechanism of relative 
efficiency in the urban water sector. Third, by demonstrating the existence and operation of the 
postulated fundamental causal mechanism of relative efficiency through the direct observation 
of remediable institutional alignment. Hence, remediable institutional alignment addresses the 
critical realist concern for identifying the fundamental causal mechanisms of social phenomena. 
 
Remediable institutional alignment accounts for circular, cumulative and path dependent 
causation. Similarly to Liebowitz and Margolis (1995), remediable institutional alignment 
incorporates three degrees of path dependency albeit in function of the historical alignment of 
actors’ attitudes, power and institutions. First, the alignment of high-powered incentives to 
appropriate net gains, asymmetric power and favourable institutions locks-in private sector 
inefficiency due to high resilience to sustainability-oriented change. Second, high-powered 
incentives do not necessarily lock-in public sector inefficiency as institutions designed to 
facilitate the achievement of collective goals may realign incentives from high- to low-
powered. Third, low-powered incentives aligned to institutions underpinning the achievement 
of collective goals corresponds to positive path dependency under efficient public operations 
due to low resilience to sustainability-oriented change and adaptive performance. This non-
linear account of causality in complex open systems contrasts with the deterministic linearity 
of rational choice narratives that neglect the behavioural flexibility of the public sector.          
 
Consistently with critical realist emancipatory aspirations, remediable institutional alignment 
is more amenable to addressing issues of social justice than the extant theory of the firm. If 
depoliticising governance makes invisible the power relationships that reproduce social 
injustice (Swyngedouw, 2005; Cleaver, 2005), remediable institutional alignment’s 
contribution to social justice is multifold. Inductively constructed and reflecting the duality of 
agency and institutions, remediable institutional alignment is concerned with the process and 
outcome of service delivery. It thus goes beyond a focus on ex-ante incentive alignment to 
reveal the ex-post consequences of institutional alignment for the intended beneficiaries of 
water services. It also avoids caricaturising government as inherently malevolent or benevolent 
to allow for the emancipatory possibility of democratic governance. Crucially, remediable 
institutional alignment mobilises the concept of networked power to operationalise the duality 
of agency and institutions. Together with its emphasis on allocative efficiency and adaptive 
performance, this attention to power contributes to credibly addressing social injustice. 
 
Lobina (2013) identifies the main themes of a future research agenda for a heterodox and 
critical realist theory of the firm. First, elaborating on sustainable development as a social 
welfare function and defining attribute of transactions in the urban water sector. Second, 
formulating a behavioural assumption accounting for multiple rationalities and interdependent 
relations to offer a non-reductionist representation of agents’ mental models. Third, identifying 
the attributes of diverse public organisational modes, from traditional public administration to 
corporatised enterprises, that enable sustainable water operations. Some progress in this 
direction has been made by Lobina and Hall’s (2014) comparative institutional analysis of 
weak and strong forms of corporatisation. Fourth, investigating the role of informal institutions 
in remediable institutional alignment. In this sense, building on Lobina (forthcoming, 2016), 
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the candidate has started work on wicked problems as institutional dilemmas that can be solved 
by understanding norms and customs. This bodes well for the development of the remediable 
institutional alignment project. 
 
Finally, the remediable institutional alignment project promises insights relevant to the 
metatheoretical debates underpinning this case for support. Although this cannot be discussed 
in detail here, the differentiation between orthodox and heterodox economics remains highly 
controversial (Hodgson, 2006; Lawson, 2005; Colander et al., 2007) and could benefit from 
greater conceptual clarity. The observation that Williamson (2002) distances himself from 
orthodoxy in light of the object of analysis, while Pratten (1997) regards Williamson as 
orthodox in view of the method of explanation, is a case in point. This suggests that the 
dichotomous distinction between outright orthodoxy and pure heterodoxy is inadequate to 
comprehend the diverse richness of economic positions. Developing the remediable 
institutional alignment project within the metatheoretical framework of orthodox and heterodox 
economics offers the possibility of future contributions to the debate on the nature of 
institutional economics.               
 
Conclusions                 
This PhD by published work carries out a comparative institutional analysis of public and 
private operations of urban water supply and sanitation services in developed, transition and 
developing countries. The analysis of a unique body of qualitative empirical evidence has 
benefitted from an epistemic strategy combining theoretical bricolage and paradox, offering a 
socialised account of the agency of water service governance and identifying incongruities in 
rational choice narratives of relative efficiency. The thesis makes three main contributions.  
 
First, mainstream expectations of superior private sector efficiency in the urban water sector do 
not hold. Second, mainstream expectations of intrinsic public sector inefficiency are unfounded. 
In fact, the alignment of actors’ attitudes, power and institutions results in private water 
operators appropriating net gains at the expense of the served communities. Also, this alignment 
can and does lead to public sector efficiency. The profit maximisation imperative, which is 
inherent to the private sector and does not necessarily informs public operations, is the 
discriminant variable explaining these findings. Third, consisting in the alignment of actors’ 
motivation, power, and institutions with sustainable development objectives, remediable 
institutional alignment is the fundamental causal mechanism behind relative efficiency in the 
urban water sector.  
 
Remediable institutional alignment accounts for the necessity of private inefficiency and 
possibility of public efficiency. It thus innovates in relation to extant theories of the firm 
predicting the necessity of private efficiency and public inefficiency (public choice and 
property right theory), the possibility of public and private efficiency (Williamson’s 
comparative institutional analysis), and the necessity of public efficiency and private 
inefficiency (market failure). Remediable institutional alignment’s predictions support the 
prescriptions that the public sector should be preferred over the private sector to enhance 
sustainable water development and pursue social justice, and that in-house restructuring should 
be adopted to underpin and secure public sector efficiency and adaptive performance. 
 
As such, remediable institutional alignment is a core component of a prospective heterodox and 
critical realist theory of the firm. These prospective heterodox and critical realist theory 
promises to operationalise comparative institutional analysis beyond Oliver Williamson’s 
important contribution. Achieving this ambitious goal requires more precisely defining other 
components of a heterodox narrative of relative efficiency in the urban water sector, including 
the social welfare function of water services and a realist behavioural assumption. Crucially, 
this future research agenda involves explaining institutions in all their complexity and shedding 
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light on the interrelationship between the regulative, normative and cognitive elements of 
institutions implicated in water service governance. The body of published work submitted 
contains few observations on the role of norms in enabling and constraining agency in the water 
sector (Lobina, 2013). A critical realist agenda is apt to address this limitation, as critical 
realism’s attention to interpretive frames as determinants of historical contingency promises to 
elicit relevant insights. Finally, this research agenda must include the extensive testing of the 
remediable institutional alignment proposition, for example by examining the microanalytics 
of hybrid organisational modes such as corporatisation. This analysis is deferred to future work.           
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Appendix 1 – Cases of monopolistic behaviour by 
private operators 
Tables 1 and 2 below provide a synopsis of the evidence of monopolistic behaviour by private 
operators, respectively in high-income countries and middle- and low-income countries, as 
evidenced in the submitted published work. Both tables list cases of water privatisation and 
PSP and, for each case, indicate: the city or region, and country where private operations are 
performed; the owner of the local private operator; the effects of private sector inefficiency, 
distinguished between inflated pricing, reduced or deferred investment, and poor service 
quality; the factors of private sector inefficiency, or the tactics deployed by the private sector 
to extract net gains from local operations.  
 
The factors of private sector inefficiency and tactics deployed include: corruption (e.g. bribery 
of public officials); financial inducements to conceding authorities (e.g. payment of concession 
fees to local governments); tariff manipulation (e.g. provision of incorrect data to regulatory 
authorities, incorrect indexation of tariff formulas, overestimated demand in the form of 
overestimated consumption or population growth); transfer pricing (e.g. transfer pricing via 
subcontracting of works and service contracts to subsidiaries of the mother company); contract 
renegotiation (e.g. amendment of concession agreements or governmental licenses); guaranteed 
profits (e.g. fixed rate of return guaranteed in concession agreement); commercial 
confidentiality (e.g. secret tariff formulas, financial data, or contractual agreements); anti-
competitive behaviour (e.g. unlimited duration of concession, or uncompetitive renewal of 
lease); political risk management (e.g. use or threat to use international arbitration in dispute); 
and, extra-legal pressure (e.g. unilateral suspension of concession fee payment or unilateral 
suspension of service delivery used as dispute solution mechanisms). Finally, the endnotes to 
the tables indicate the submitted published work that constitute the sources of the evidence. 
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Table 1. Cases of monopolistic behaviour by private operators (high-income countries) 
No. Country City or 
region 
Contractual 
arrangement 
Private 
company 
Effects of 
inefficiency 
Factors of inefficiency Source  
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1 Belgium Brussels BOT 
(wastewater) 
Veolia   x     x     x Lobina (2013: 118) 
2 Chile Santiago Concession Suez x        x  x   Lobina (2005: 60-61, 65) 
3 Czech 
Republic 
Ceske 
Budejovice 
Divestiture Anglian 
Water 
x          x   Lobina and Hall (2000: 38) 
4 France Avignon Lease Veolia x     x        Lobina (2013: 116) 
5 France Bandol-
Savary 
Lease Veolia x     x        Lobina (2013: 116) 
6 France Grenoble Lease Suez x   x x x x x    x  Lobina and Hall (2007: 96-
100) 
7 France Nice Lease Veolia x     x     x   Lobina (2013: 116; 2005: 59); 
Hall and Lobina (2004: 270) 
8 Germany Potsdam Lease Suez x          x   Lobina (2005: 65) 
9 Germany Rostock Concession Suez x     x  x      Lobina (2005: 61) 
10 Italy Arezzo Concession Suez x x   x x x x    x x Lobina (2013: 117) 
11 Italy Milan BOT 
(wastewater) 
Veolia x   x          Lobina (2013: 119) 
12 UK England 
and Wales 
Divestiture Various x x x   x  x  x x   Lobina (2013: 117, 122); 
Lobina and Hall (2000: 38) 
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Table 2. Cases of monopolistic behaviour by private operators (middle and low-income countries) 
No. Country City or 
region 
Contractual 
arrangement 
Private 
company 
Effects of 
inefficiency 
Factors of inefficiency Source  
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1 Argentina Buenos 
Aires 
Concession Suez x x    x  x    x  Lobina (2005: 62, 64-65, 
74); Hall and Lobina 
(2004: 271-272) 
2 Argentina Buenos 
Aires 
Province 
Concession Azurix   x         x  Lobina (2005: 65) 
3 Argentina Cordoba Concession Suez  x            Lobina (2005: 62) 
4 Argentina Santa Fe 
Province 
Concession Suez x x      x    x  Lobina (2005: 60, 62, 64, 
68) 
5 Argentina Tucuman Concession Veolia x x x         x  Lobina (2005: 65); Lobina 
and Hall (2000: 38) 
6 Belize National Divestiture Cascal x x            Lobina (2005: 62) 
7 Bolivia Cochabamba Concession International 
Water Ltd 
x        x x x   Lobina (2005: 59; 66, 74-
75) 
8 Brazil Campo 
Grande 
Concession Suez  x            Lobina (2005: 62) 
9 Brazil Paraná State Concession Veolia x  x        x   Lobina (2005: 78) 
10 China Chengdu BOT (bulk 
water supply) 
Veolia; 
Marubeni 
x     x        Lobina (2005: 61) 
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Contractual 
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Factors of inefficiency Source  
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11 Guinea Conakry Lease SAUR; 
Veolia 
x     x    x    Lobina (2005: 67) 
12 Hungary Budapest Concession Suez x             Lobina and Hall (2000: 37, 
39) 
13 Hungary Szeged Lease Veolia x      x     x  Lobina (2005: 65-66); 
Lobina and Hall (2000: 44) 
14 Lesotho Lesotho 
Highlands 
Concession 
(bulk water 
supply) 
Suez; 
Bouygues; 
RWE 
x   x          Hall and Lobina (2004: 
270) 
15 Philippines Manila I Concession Suez x x x  x x x x    x x Lobina (2005: 62, 64, 68, 
71-72, 74, 76) 
16 Philippines Manila II Concession International 
Water Ltd 
  x   x      x  Lobina (2005: 62, 64, 76) 
17 South 
Africa 
KwaDukuza Concession SAUR x x   x x  x      Lobina (2005: 61, 64); Hall 
and Lobina (2004: 270-
271) 
18 Turkey Izmit BOT (bulk 
water supply) 
Thames 
Water 
x     x  x      Lobina (2005: 61); Hall 
and Lobina (2004: 273-
274) 
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Appendix 2 – Cases of public sector efficiency 
Tables 3 and 4 below provide a synopsis of the evidence of efficiency by public operators, 
respectively in high-income countries and middle- and low-income countries, as evidenced in 
the submitted published work. Both tables list cases of public water operations and, for each 
case, indicate: the location where public operations are performed (at city, regional or national 
level); whether the public operator is owned by municipal, provincial or national governments; 
the evidence of public sector efficiency, distinguished between satisfactory performance (as per 
industry standards), improved performance (as a result of in-house restructuring), comparison 
with a private bid (e.g. an unsolicited bid to take over operations), horizontal benchmarking 
(e.g. the comparison with the performance of private operations in other cities), and vertical 
benchmarking (i.e. the comparison with the performance of private operations in the same city 
or operating area); the factors of public sector efficiency, or the institutional and organisational 
attributes explaining the observed efficiency.  
 
The factors of public sector efficiency and institutional and organisational attributes include: 
democratic governance (e.g. political leadership, social mobilisation); policy learning (e.g. 
emulation of organisational and operational practice, coercion to corporate governance reform); 
threat of privatisation (i.e. governmental decision to introduce PSP); not-for-profit partnerships 
for capacity development (e.g. public-public partnerships, public-community partnerships, 
labour-management partnerships); national law (e.g. regulatory regime, contract law); 
regulation (e.g. regulation by public owners or a public agency); TAP (formal decision making 
mechanisms of transparency, accountability and participation); the absence of or limitation to 
profit motive (e.g. prohibition of or restrictions to the payment of dividends to public owners); 
corporatisation (e.g. in-house restructuring, managerial autonomy, cost recovery); and, change 
in organisational scale (e.g. inter-municipal mergers, extension of service area to adjacent 
municipalities, decentralisation). Finally, the tables indicate the submitted published work 
providing the evidence for these observations. 
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Table 3. Cases of public sector efficiency (high-income countries) 
No. Country City or 
region 
Ownership Public 
enterprise 
Evidence of efficiency Factors of efficiency Source  
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1 France Grenoble Municipal REG x    x x    x x x x x  Lobina and Hall (2007: 
96, 98-107)  
2 France various Municipal various    x      x x  x   Lobina (2013: 118); 
Lobina and Hall (2007: 
102, 107) 
3 Germany various Municipal various x   x          x x Lobina and Hall (2000: 
42) 
4 Lithuania Kaunas Municipal Kauno 
Vandenys 
 x     x  x    x x  Lobina and Hall (2008: 
97-98); Lobina (2013: 
119)  
5 Netherlands various Municipal; 
Provincial 
various x         x x x x x x Lobina and Hall (2000: 
41-42) 
6 Poland Łodz Municipal Łodz Water 
Company 
  x x    x x     x  Lobina and Hall (2000: 
44-45, 47) 
7 Sweden Gothenburg Municipal Förvaltningen 
kretslopp och 
vatten 
   x      x   x   Lobina and Hall (2000: 
40) 
8 Sweden Helsingborg Municipal NSVA    x      x   x x  Lobina and Hall (2000: 
40) 
9 Sweden Stockholm Municipal Stockholm 
Vatten 
x x  x      x   x x  Lobina and Hall (2000: 
40-41) 
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Table 4. Cases of public sector efficiency (middle and low-income countries) 
No. Country City or 
region 
Ownership Public 
enterprise 
Evidence of efficiency Factors of efficiency Source  
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1 Brazil  Porto Alegre Municipal DMAE  x    x x    x x x x  Lobina and Hall (2008: 96-
97); Lobina (2013: 119)  
2 Brazil São Paulo State SABESP x x    x x       x x Lobina and Hall (2008: 
97); Lobina and Hall 
(2000: 49-50)  
3 Burkina 
Faso 
National State ONEA  x   x           Lobina (2013: 120) 
4 Cambodia  Phnom Penh State PPWSA x x            x  Lobina and Hall (2008: 
93); Lobina (2013: 119-
120) 
5 Honduras Tegucigalpa State SANAA  x      x x     x x Lobina and Hall (2000: 47-
48) 
6 Hungary Debrecen Municipal Debreceni 
Vizmu 
  x x    x x     x  Lobina and Hall (2000: 42-
46) 
7 India Ahmedabad Municipal Ahmedabad 
Municipal 
Corporation 
 x       x       Lobina (2013: 119) 
8 Philippines various Municipal Water 
Districts 
x   x     x  x x  x  Lobina and Hall (2000: 51-
52) 
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No. Country City or 
region 
Ownership Public 
enterprise 
Evidence of efficiency Factors of efficiency Source  
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9 South 
Africa 
Cape Town Municipal Water and 
Sanitation 
Department 
 x      x x       Lobina and Hall (2000: 51) 
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Appendix 3 – Full text of papers included in the 
submission 
This appendix contains the full text of papers included in the submission. These papers are 
listed at page 1 of this case for support.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
